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Chapter 1
Continuous Features Discretizaion for Anomaly
Intrusion Detectors Generation
Amira Sayed A.Aziz, Ahmad Taher Azar, Aboul ella Hassanien, Sanaa Al-Ola
Hanafy
Abstract Network security is a growing issue, with the evolution of computer sys-
tems and expansion of attacks. Biological systems have been inspiring scientists
and designs for new adaptive solutions, such as genetic algorithms. In this paper,
we present an approach that uses the genetic algorithm to generate anomaly net-
work intrusion detectors. In this paper, an algorithm propose use a discretization
method for the continuous features selected for the intrusion detection, to create
some homogeneity between values, which have different data types. Then,the in-
trusion detection system is tested against the NSL-KDD data set using different
distance methods. A comparison is held amongst the results, and it is shown by the
end that this proposed approach has good results, and recommendations is given for
future experiments.
1.1 Introduction
With the evolution of computer networks during the past few years, security is a
crucial issue and a basic demand for computer systems. Attacks are expanding and
evolving as well, making it important to find and work on new and advanced solu-
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tions for network security. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been around us
for a some time, as an essential mechanism to protect computer systems, where they
identify malicious activities that occur in that protected system. Genetic Algorithms
(GA) are a group of computational models inspired by natural selection. This so-
lution works on a group of chromosomes-like data structure (a population) where
they reproduce and the new generation replaces the old one if it’s more fitting in
the environment. These new generations are generated using selection and recom-
bination functions such as crossover and mutation [1]. The GAs were first seen as
optimization solutions, but now they are applied in a variety of systems, including
the IDSs. The GA then is used as a machine learning technique to generate artificial
intelligence detection rules. The rules are usually in the if-then forms, where the
conditions are values that represent normal samples or values to indicate an intru-
sion is in the act [1], [2]. For a Network-based IDS (NIDS), usually the network
traffic is used to build a model and detect anomalous network activities. Many fea-
tures can be extracted and used in a GA to generate the rules, and these features may
be of different data types, and may have a wide range of values. So, in our paper we
propose using a discretization algorithm with continuous features to create homo-
geneity amongst features.
—add more in introduction about discretization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives a background of the
different algorithms used in our approach. Section 1.3 gives a review on some of the
previous work done in the area. Section 1.4 describes the proposed approach, Sec-
tion 1.5 gives an overview of the experiment and results, and we list our conclusions
and future work in Section 1.6.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Anomaly Intrusion Detection
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are security tools used to detect anomalous or
malicious activity from inside and outside intruders. An IDS can be host-based or
network-based, which is the concern in this paper. They are classified by many axes,
one of them is the detection methodology that classifies them to signature-based and
anomaly-based IDS. The former detects attacks by comparing the data to patterns
stored in a signature database of known attacks. The later detects anomalies by
defining a model of normal behaviour of the monitored system, then considers any
behavior lying outside the model as anomalous or suspicious activity. Signature-
based IDS can detect well-known attacks with high accuracy but fails to detect
or find unknown attacks. Anomaly-based IDS has the ability to detect new or un-
known attacks but usually has high false positives rate (normal activities detected
as anomalous). There are three types of anomaly detection techniques: statistical-
based, knowledge-based, and machine learning-based, as shown in the figure below.
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We can measure an IDS performance by two key aspects: the detection process ef-
ficiency and the involved cost of the operation [3].
1.2.2 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic Algorithm (GA) is an evolutionary computational technique that is used as
a search algorithm, based on the concepts of natural selection and genetics. There
are 3 meanings of search: 1- Search for stored data: where the problem is to retrieve
some information stored in a computer memory efficiency. 2- Search for paths to
goals: where one needs to find the best paths from an initial state to a goal. 3-
Search for solutions: where one needs to find a solution or group of solutions in
a large space of candidates. GA works on a population of individuals, where each
individual is called a chromosome and is composed of a string of values called
genes. The population goes through a process to find a solution or group of high
quality solutions. The quality of an individual is measured by a fitness function that
is dependant on the environment and application. The process starts with an initial
population, that goes through transformation for a number of generations. During
each generation, three major operations are applied sequentially to each individual:
selection, crossover, and mutation. This is shown in Figure 1.1 [4][2].
Fig. 1.1 Genetic Algorithm Process
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1.2.3 Negative Selection Approach
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are inspired by the nature’s Human Immune Sys-
tem (HIS), which is an adaptive, tolerant, self-protecting, and dynamic defence sys-
tem. AIS is a set of algorithms that mimic the different functionalities of the HIS,
and they can perform a range of tasks. The major algorithms are: negative selec-
tion, clonal selection, and immunity networks. The Negative Selection Approach
(NSA) is based on the concept of self-nonself discrimination, by first creating a pro-
file of the self (normal) behaviour and components. Then use this profile to rule out
any behaviour that doesn’t match with that profile. The training phase goes on the
self samples. Then, the detectors are exposed to different samples, and if a detector
matches a self as nonself then it’s discarded. The final group of detectors (mature
detectors) are released to start the detection process [5].
1.2.4 Equal-Width Binning Algorithm
There are many discretization algorithms for continuous features to discretize them
for algorithmic purposes. These discretization algorithms are very important for ma-
chine learning, as tis is required by some algorithms. But more importantly, the
discretization increases the speed of induction algorithms. The discretization algo-
rithms are classified in many ways — as shown in Table 1 below [6] [7] [8].
1.3 Previous Work
In this section, a number of papers which investigated the discretization algorithms,
combining them with other methods for clustering and feature selection, are high-
lighted in Table 2.
Authors Technique Results
J. Dougherty,
R. Kohavi, M.
Sahami [9]
Applied EWB, 1R, and Re-
cursive Entropy Partitioning
as preprocessing step before
using C4.5 and Naive-Bayes
classifiers on data. Data Set:
16 data sets from the UC
Irvine (UCI) Repository.
C4.5 performance. improved
on 2 data sets using entropy
discretization, but slightly de-
creased on some. At 95 %
confidence level, Naive-Bayes
with entropy discretization is
better than C4.5 on 5 data sets
and worse on 2 (with average
accuracy 83.97% vs. 82.25%
for C4.5)
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Ellis J.
Clarke, Bruce
A. Barton
[10]
They used Minimum Descrip-
tive Length (MDL) to se-
lect number of intervals, and
modified a version of the k2
method for one test, entropy
based discretization for an-
other test. Data Set: NGHS
and DISC from two epidemi-
ological studies.
Dynamic Partitioning with
MDL metric lead to more
highly connected BBN than
with only entropy partitioning.
New proposed method lead
to better representations of
variable dependencies in both
data sets. But generally, using
entropy and MDL partitioning
provided clarification and
simplification in the BBN.
Zhao Jun,
Zhou Ying-
hua [11]
A rough set based heuris-
tic method, enhanced in two
ways: (1) decision informa-
tion is used in candidate cut
computation (SACC), and (2)
an estimation of cut selection
probability is defined to mea-
sure cut significance (ABSP).
Data Set: continuous UCI data
sets.
Their SACC was compared to
an algorithm knwon as UACC,
and ABSP was comapred to
some typical rough set based
discretization algorithm.
SACC performs better with
less number of cuts, and ABSP
slightly improves predictive
accuracies.
Anika Gupta,
Kishan
Mehrotra,
Chilukuri
Mohan [7]
They applied clustering as
a preprocessing step before
the discretization process. For
clustering they used: k-means
with euclidean distance simi-
larity metric, and Shared Near-
est Neighbour (SNN). For dis-
cretization they used a gener-
alized version of MDL with
alpha=Beta=0.5 (ME-MDL).
Data Set: 11 data sets from
UCI repository.
Comparing their algorithm re-
sults with ME-MDL results:
in all data sets, when SNN
or k-means clustering is used,
the proposed algorithm gives
better results. In heart data
set, SNN clustering does better
than ME-MDL. In other data
sets, k-means does better than
SNN.
Daniela Joita
[12]
A discretization algorithm
based on the k-means cluster-
ing algorithm, and that avoids
the O(n log n) time required
for sorting.
The algorithm was proposed to
be tested in the future.
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Shunling
Chen, Liny
Tang, Wei
Jun Liu,
Yonghong Li
[13]
An improved method of con-
tinuous attributes discretiza-
tion by: (1) hierarchical clus-
tering is applied to form initial
division of the attribute, and
(2) merging adjacent ranges
based on entropy, taking into
consideration not to affect
level of consistency of the de-
cision table. Data Set: data
of their provincial educational
committee project.
Not listed, but mentioned to
prove the validity of their algo-
rithm.
Artur J.
Ferreira,
Mario A.T.
Figueirdo
[14]
They used clustering with dis-
cretization for better results.
They proposed an updated
version of the well-know
Linde-Buzp-Gray (LBG)
algorithm: U-LBG1 (used a
variable number of bits) and
U-LBG2 (used a fixed num-
ber of bits). For clustering,
they used the Relevance-
Redundancy Feature Selection
(RRFS) and Relevance Fea-
ture Selection (RFS) methods.
Data Set: data sets from
UCI, the five data sets of
the NIP2003 FS challenge,
and several micro-array gene
expression data sets (no nor-
malization was applied on any
of the used data sets).
The proposed approaches allo-
cated a small number of bits
per feature. RRFS performs
better than RS for eliminating
redundant features.
Also very good reviews are given in [8] and [15].
1.4 Proposed Approach
1.4.1 Motivation
In [16] The algorithm was originally suggested with the application on real-valued
features in the NSL-KDD data set. It was used with a variation parameter defining
the upper and lower limits of the detectors values (conditions). It had very good re-
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Table 1.1 Discretization Algorithms Classification
Local vs. Global Local methods apply partitions on localized regions of the
instance space. Global methods works on the entire in-
stance space, that every feature is partitioned into number
of regions independent of other attributes.
Supervised vs. Unsupervised Supervised methods make use of the class labels associ-
ated with the instances in the process, while unsupervised
methods perform discretization regardless of class label.
Static vs. Dynamic Static methods determine the number of bins for each fea-
ture independent of other features after performing one dis-
cretization pass of the data (performed before the classifi-
cation). Dynamic methods determine the number of bins
for all features simultaneously by a search through the data
space (performed while the classifier is built).
Top-down(Splitting) vs. Bottom-
up (Merging)
Splitting methods start with an empty group of cut points,
and build up during the discretization process. While in
merging, the algorithm starts with a list of cut points, then
discards unneeded ones during discretization by merging
intervals.
Direct vs. Incremental In direct methods, number of bins (intervals) is predefined
either by user or using an algorithm. Incremental methods
start with simple discretization that gets improved and re-
fined until stopped by a conditon (meeting a certain crite-
rion).
sults, but the real-valued features are not enough to detect all types of attacks, so the
algorithm should expand to include features of different types. In [17], they applied
the algorithm on the KDD data set, using a range of features to detect anomalies. The
problem with using different features is that they have different data types ranges:
binary, categorical, and continuous (real and integer). This may lead to problems
while applying the algorithm. First of all, a wide range of values need to be cov-
ered in a way that can represent each region uniquely. Secondly, there should be
some sort of homogeneity between features values to apply the GA. So, the use of
some discretization algorithm for continuous features lead to the suggestion of our
approach.
1.4.2 Suggested Approach
Continuous features discretization methods increase the speed of induction algo-
rithms, beside being an algorithmic requirement in machine learning. Equal-width
interval binning [6] is the simplest method for data discretization, where the range
of values is divided into k equally sized bins, as k is a parameter supplied by the
user as the required number of bins. The bin width is calculated as:
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δ =
xmax− xmin
k
(1.1)
and the bin boundaries are set as: xmin+iδ , i=1,...,k-1.
The equal-width interval binning algorithm is global, unsupervised, and static
discretization algorithm.
The suggested approach starts with binning the continuous features with a pre-
viously defined number of bins, Then, replace each feature value with its enclosing
bin number. Finally, run the GA on the modified data set samples to generate the de-
tectors (rules). Following the NSA concepts, this is applied on the normal samples
through the training phase. The self samples are presented in the self space S. The
process is shown in Algorithm I.
Algorithm 1 Proposed Algorithm
1: Run equal-width binning algorithm on continuous features.
2: Initialize population by selecting random individuals from the space S.
3: for The specified number of generations do
4: for The size of the population do
5: Select two individuals (with uniform probability) as parent1 and parent2.
6: Apply crossover to produce a new individual (child).
7: Apply mutation to child.
8: Calculate the distance between child and parent1 as d1, and the distance between child
and parent2 as d2.
9: Calculate the fitness of child, parent1, and parent2 as f , f1, and f2 respectively.
10: if (d1 < d2) and ( f > f1) then
11: replace parent1 with child
12: else
13: if (d2 <= d1) and ( f > f2) then
14: Replace parent2 with child.
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: Extract the best (highly-fitted) individuals as your final solution.
The fitness - which was inspired from [18] - is measured by calculating the
matching percentage between an individual and the normal samples, as:
f itness(x) =
a
A
(1.2)
where a is the number of samples matching the individual by 100% , and A is the
total number of normal samples. Three different distance methods were tested (one
at a time), to find the best results. The distances measured between a child X and a
parent Y using the following formulas:
• The Euclidean distance as:
d(X ,Y ) =
√
(x1− y1)2 +(x2− y2)2 . . .(xn− yn)2 (1.3)
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• The Hamming distance, which defines the difference between 2 strings (usually
binary) as the number of places in which the strings have different values[19]. So
it’s calculated as (where n is number of features):
d(X ,Y ) =
n
∑
i=0
|(xi− yi)| (1.4)
• The Minkowski Distance, which is similar to the Euclidean distance but uses the
p-norm dimension as the power value instead. So, the formula goes as:
d(X ,Y ) = (
n
∑
i=0
(|xi− yi|p))1/p (1.5)
The euclidean distance uses the same equation with p=2. If - for example - p=1,
then it’s the Manhattan distance. In the Minkowski distance case, p can be any
value larger than 0 and up to infinity. It can be have real value between 0 and
1. If we are interested in finding the difference between objects, then we should
aim for high p values. If we are interested in finding the how much the objects
are similar, then we should go for low p values [20]. In our experiment, a small
value of 0.5 was used, and a big values of 18 was used to compare results.
1.5 Experiment
1.5.1 Data Set
The NSL-KDD IDS data set [21] was proposed in [22] to solve some issues in the
widely use KDD Cup 99 data set. These issues affect the performance of the systems
that use the KDD data set and results in very poor evaluation of them. The resulted
data set is having a reasonable size and is unbiased, and it’s affordable to use in the
experiments without having to select a small portion of the data. The data sets used
in our experiment are:
• KDDTrain+ 20Percent normal samples for training and generating the detectors.
• KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+ for testing, where the difference between them is
that the Test set include additional unknown attacks that are not included in the
Train set.
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1.5.2 Experiment Settings
Following [17], we selected the same features they used, which are shown in table
II. We would like to clarify that the Ports classification was performed manually,
where ports were classified into 9 categories that were used in [17]. It was done
manually because it is dependent on the network and system settings more than
number ranges.
Table 1.3 Features Selected from NSL-KDD Data Set
Feature Description Data Type No. of
Bins
duration Connection duration Integer 8
protocol type Protocol type Categorial N/A
service Port category Integer 9
land Land packet Binary N/A
urgent No. of urgent packets Integer 1
host No. of ”hot” indicators Integer 3
num failed loginsNo. of failed login attempts Integer 3
logged in If user logged in Binary N/A
root shell If root shell obtained Binary N/A
su attempted If command ”su root” attempted Binary N/A
num file creationsNo. of file creations Integer 4
num shells No. of open shell prompts Integer 2
is host login If user in ”hot list” Binary N/A
is guest login If user logged as guest Binary N/A
count No. of connections to same host in past 2 s Integer 10
same srv rate % of connections to same port in past 2 s Real 3
diff srv rate % of connections to different ports in past 2 s Real 3
srv diff host rate % of connections to different hosts in past 2 s Real 3
The values used for the GA parameters were:
• Population size: 200, 400, 600
• Number of generations: 200, 500, 1000, 2000
• Mutation rate: 2/L, where L is the number of features.
• Crossover rate: 1.0
Different values of population size and number of generations were used to com-
pare the results to see which would lead to better results.
1.5.3 Results
After running the algorithm on the train set normal samples, we had sets of detectors
(rules) dependent on population size and number of generations. Running those
detectors on the test set, the detection rates are shown in figure 1.2
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Fig. 1.2 Test Set Detection Rates
As shown in figure 1.2, the detection rates are not very high - as the maximum
detection rates realized are 73.23% and 73.31% obtained by the detectors generated
by GA applying Euclidean and Minkowski (p=0.5) distances respectively. The rates
with population size 200 are generally better. To measure the IDS efficiency, true
positives and true negatives rates (TPR and TNR respectively) are calculated and
shown in figures 1.3 and 1.4.
Fig. 1.3 True Positives Rates
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Fig. 1.4 True Negatives Rates
We can realize in figure 1.3 that the recognition of normal samples is high as the
TPRs are close to 96% with FPRs all less than 7%. The problem is the discrimination
between normal and anomalous samples, as the TNRs (Figure 1.4) are all below
60% with FNRs all above 40%. So, the IDS is not able to detect all anomalies
as some are seen as normal activities. Better TNRs are obtained using detectors
generated using bigger population size, mostly with the Minkowski distance.
1.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In the paper, an algorithm is implemented to generate detectors that should be able
to detect anomalous activities in the network. The data was pre-processed before
using them in the algorithm, by discretizing the continuous features to create ho-
mogeneity between data values, by replacing values with bin numbers. Seeing the
results, we can see that the equal-width interval binning algorithm that we used is
very simple but not very efficient. As mentioned before, it’s static and global, hence
it doesn’t take into consideration the relations between features and whether the
predefined number of bins is efficient or not. As for the parameters of the GA, the
detectors generated by GA with smaller population size gave better detection rates,
true alarms, and lower false alarms that others generated using higher population
sizes.Our future work will be focusing on applying other discretization algorithms
that are more dynamic, and consider using other features to detect more anomalies.
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